Does the notice below look familiar?
Chase is letting our customers know that we have been informed by Epsilon, a vendor we use to send e-mails, that an unauthorized person outside Epsilon accessed files that included e-mail addresses of some Chase customers. We have a team at Epsilon investigating and we are confident that the information that was retrieved included some Chase customer e-mail addresses, but did not include any customer account or financial information.
If it does, congratulations on being one of the unlucky millions affected by the data breach which occurred at Epsilon last week. The largest distributor of "permission-based" email marketing, Epsilon serves some 2,500+ clients from JPMorgan and Chase to Target and Walgreens, sending over 40 billion emails on their behalf each year.
At some point on Wednesday, March 30, Epsilon's systems were hacked, resulting in millions of email addresses and names being stolen, presumably in order for hackers to send mass spam and convincing "phishing" emails to consumers. The first I became aware of the breach was Monday, April 4, when I received the above notice from Chase, followed quickly by Target, 1-800-Flowers and a variety of other smaller companies over the next two days.
As I received the latest emails this morning (World Financial Network National Bank, or WFNNB, and Citibank), I couldn't help but be impressed with how quickly Epsilon was able to detect the data breach, notify law enforcement, and notify its clients affected by the breach, reportedly about 50 companies. The turnaround time within which many of the affected clients notified their consumers was equally impressive, especially given that these companies likely only received notice from Epsilon right before or over the weekend.
I automatically wondered: would such a response have been equally efficient and effective if the data breach had occurred within the HIT systems of a business associate of a hospital or within the hospital itself? Maybe yes and maybe no.
HITECH places stringent security breach notification requirements and timeframes on covered entities and business associates who experience breaches of PHI. In addition, state laws such as the New Jersey's Identity Theft Prevention Act, also place breach notification requirements on these and other entities with regard to certain personal information.
Covered entities, as we are all too aware, are certainly not immune from the risk of security breaches. Many covered entities may not have detailed policies and procedures for detecting and responding to breaches of PHI. For those that do, are these procedures effectively communicated to key management and employees so that they know how to appropriately react from the first sign of a breach through the sending of required notices? In addition, how soon and by what mechanisms are business associates required to report breaches, or even suspected breaches, of PHI to the covered entity?
Although only emails and names were hacked, the Epsilon breach stresses how important it is for covered entities to assess their security breach notification policies and procedures and ensure key personnel know the steps for detecting, assessing and mitigating breaches of PHI and their respective roles and responsibilities BEFORE these individuals are placed in such a situation.
A mere five calendar days (including the weekend) is quite impressive for a breach response involving so many different companies. Although perhaps five days might be improbable or even impossible for a covered entity under the circumstances of a given breach, immediate and efficient action and communication are still crucial to an effective breach response.